The Laissez-faire Message of Classical Political Economy
Classical political economy, the core works of economic literature from the time of William Petty through that of David Ricardo, presents an imposing facade. The towering figures of early political economy forged a new way of thinking systematically about economic affairs in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries with little more than the writings of business people and moral philosophers to guide them. Every one, from Karl Marx, who created the term ''classical political economy,'' to modern-day conservatives, recognizes the enormous intellectual achievement of these early economists.
For more than two centuries, successive generations of economists have been grinding out texts to demonstrate how these early theorists discovered that markets provide the most efficient method for organizing production. An uncompromising advocacy of laissez-faire is, ostensibly, the intended lesson of classical political economy.
Most contemporary readers of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and the other classical political economists accept their work at face value, assuming these early writers to be uncompromising advocates of laissez-faire. For the most part, even many Marxists accept this interpretation of classical political economy. Alongside their work on pure economic theory, the classical political economists engaged in a parallel project: to promote the forcible reconstruction of society into a purely market-oriented system. While economic historians may debate the depth of involvement in market activities at the time, the incontestable fact remains that most people in Britain did not enthusiastically engage in wage labor-at least so long as they had an alternative.
To make sure that people accepted wage labor, the classical political economists actively advocated measures to deprive people of their traditional means of support. The brutal acts associated with the process of stripping the majority of the people of the means of producing for themselves might seem far removed from the laissez-faire reputation of classical political economy. In reality, the dispossession of the majority of small-scale producers and the construction of laissez-faire are closely connected, so much so that Marx, or at least his translators, labeled this expropriation of the masses as ''primitive accumulation.''
The very sound of the expression, primitive accumulation, drips with poignant echoes of human consequences. The word ''primitive,'' first of all, suggests a brutality lacking in the subtleties of more modern forms of exploitation. It also implies that primitive accumulation was prior to the form of accumulation that people generally associate with capitalism. Finally, it hints at something that we might associate with ''primitive'' parts of the world, where capital accumulation has not advanced as far as elsewhere.
The second term, accumulation, reminds us that the primary focus of the process was the accumulation of capital and wealth by a small sector of society, or as Marx (1977, described it, ''the conquest of the world of social wealth. It is the extension of the area of exploited human material and, at the same time, the extension of the indirect and direct sway of the capitalist.'' Certainly, at least in the early stages of capitalism, primitive accumulation was a central element in the accumulation process.
Although many modern scholars acknowledge the pervasive nature of primitive accumulation during the time that the classical political economists wrote, nobody to my knowledge has recognized the complicity of the classical political economists. They strongly advocated policies that furthered the process of primitive accumulation, often through subterfuge.
While energetically promoting their laissez-faire ideology, they championed time and time again policies that flew in the face of their laissez-faire principles, especially their analysis of the role of small-scale, rural producers. As we will see, the underlying development strategy of the classical political economists was consistent with a crude proto-Marxian model of primitive accumulation, which concluded that nonmarket forces might be required to speed up the process of capitalist assimilation in the countryside. This model also explains why most of the classical political economists expressed positions diametrically opposed to the theories usually credited to them.
The Secret History of Primitive Accumulation
Perhaps because so much of what the classical economists wrote about traditional systems of agricultural production was divorced from their seemingly more timeless remarks about pure theory, later readers have passed over such portions of their works in haste. Although this aspect of classical political economy might have seemed to fall outside the core of the subject, I argue that these interventionist recommendations were a significant element in the overall thrust of their works. Specifically, classical political economy advocated restricting the viability of traditional occupations in the countryside to coerce people to work for wages.
Chapter 1, which deals with the history of primitive accumulation, demonstrates the classical political economists' keen interest in driving rural workers from the countryside and into factories, compelling workers to do the bidding of those who would like to employ them, and eradicating any sign of sloth.
The vitality of these rural producers generally rested on a careful combination of industrial and agricultural pursuits. Despite the efficiency of this arrangement, classical political economy was intent on throttling small producers. Classical political economists often justified their position in terms of the efficiency of the division of labor. They called for measures that would actively promote the separation of agriculture and industry. As we shall see, Marx's concept of the social division of labor is very important in this respect. In contrast to Smith's exclusive emphasis on the division of labor-the arrangement of work within the firm-Marx suggested that we also examine the deployment of resources between individual firms and households-the social division of labor.
Classical political economists paid virtually no attention to the social division of labor in their theoretical works. For example, although Smith offered a detailed description of the division of labor in his famous pin factory, he did not bother to extend his discussion. What does it mean that society is partitioned in such a way that the pin industry purchases its metals or fuels instead of producing them itself? How does such an arrangement originate? Could such changes in the pattern of industries make a difference in an economy, even if technology were unchanging?
These questions were so distant from the purview of classical political economy that more than two centuries later, Ronald Coase won a Nobel Prize for bringing them to the attention of mainstream economists. Following in the wake of Coase, a group of modern economists developed the new institutionalist school of economics (see Perelman 1991a), which contends that economic forces naturally arrange themselves into some optimal pattern. Like many other economists, the new institutionalist school takes pride in locating anticipations of its work in classical political economy, especially in the thought of Smith. Even though the new institutionalist school concerns itself with the social division of labor, its theories are of no use in analyzing the coercive nature of primitive accumulation, since this school sees the economy arranging itself through voluntary contracts.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the theory of primitive accumulation. Most discussions of primitive accumulation address the subject as a shorthand expression for describing the brutality of the initial burst of capitalism. In contrast, this chapter makes the case for treating primitive accumulation as an essential theoretical concept in analyzing the ongoing process of capitalist accumulation.
I suspected that the continuing silence about the social division of labor might have something important to reveal. Following this line of investigation, I looked at what classical political economy had to say about the peasantry and self-sufficient agriculturalists. Here again, the pattern was consistent.
The classical political economists were unwilling to trust market forces to determine the social division of labor because they found the tenacity of traditional rural producers to be distasteful. Rather than contending that market forces should determine the fate of these small-scale producers, classical political economy called for state interventions of one sort or another to hobble these people's ability to produce for their own needs. These policy recommendations amounted to a blatant manipulation of the social division of labor.
We cannot justify such policies on the basis of efficiency. If efficiency were of great importance to them, the classical political economists would not have ignored the law permitting the gentry to ride across small farmers' fields in pursuit of foxes while forbidding the farmers from ridding their land of game that might eat the crops. As we shall see in Chapter 3, these Game Laws destroyed an enormous share of the total agricultural produce.
Chapter 3 describes the extraordinary history of the Game Laws. Although the origin of the Game Laws was feudal, their application and their ferocity peaked during the Industrial Revolution. They were a useful instrument to separate rural people from a major source of sustenance, adding considerable weight to the pressures to accept wage labor. They also incited many poor people in the countryside to rebel.
Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between primitive accumulation and the social division of labor from the standpoint of self-provisioning.
Chapter 5 analyzes classical political economy's implicit proto-Marxian theory of primitive accumulation. In addition, it discusses the pattern of practical measures that altered the social division of labor to the detriment of independent and small-scale producers. This chapter also discusses how classical political economy applied the calculus of primitive accumulation. It details the relationship between early classical political economy and the rural population with an eye toward efforts to create a capitalistic social division of labor. It demonstrates the continual importance that classical political economy placed on the process of primitive accumulation.
The Secret History of Classical Political Economy
Why has the social division of labor as an aspect of primitive accumulation gone unnoticed for so long by so many students of classical political economy? True, the classical political economists generally maintained their silence regarding primitive accumulation when discussing matters of pure economic theory-although they were not absolutely consistent in this regard.
Because of the novelty of their subject, these writers were not entirely in control of their own ideas. Specifically, I found that classical political economy openly expressed its dissatisfaction with the existing social division of labor quite clearly in diaries, letters, and more practical writings about contemporary affairs. This discovery led me to give a substantially new reading to the history of classical political economy.
In their unguarded moments, the intuition of the classical political economists led them to openly express important insights of which they may have been only vaguely, if at all, aware. As a result, they let the idea of the social division of labor surface from time to time even in their more theoretical works. The subject typically cropped up when they were acknowledging that the market seemed incapable of engaging the rural pop-ulation fast enough to suit them-or more to the point, that people were resisting wage labor. Much of this discussion touched on what we now call primitive accumulation.
Although these slips flew in the face of the laissez-faire theory of classical political economy, they add much to the value of that literature. Indeed, if classical political economy were nothing more than a conscious attempt to come to grips with and justify the emerging forces of capitalism, it would have far less contemporary interest.
Just as a psychologist might detect a crucial revelation in a seemingly offhand remark of a patient, from time to time classical political economy discloses to us insights into its program that the classical political economists would not consciously welcome. These insights will reinforce the conclusions that we draw from their diaries, letters, and more practical writings.
The Invention of Capitalism is novel in four major respects. First, it addresses the question of what determines the social division of labor, the division of society into independent firms and industries from the perspective of classical political economy. It also develops the theoretical implications of primitive accumulation. Third, this book offers a significantly different interpretation of classical political economy, demonstrating that this school of thought supported the process of primitive accumulation. Finally, it analyzes the role of primitive accumulation in the work of Marx. All of these threads come together in helping us to understand how modern capitalism developed and the role of classical political economy in furthering this process.
On Reading Classical Political Economy
Modern economists sometimes present classical political economy as a polestar by which we can fix our bearings and, in rare cases, guide ourselves toward the future. This approach is disingenuous. Despite the invaluable lessons that we can learn from studying classical political economy, economists rarely read this literature with an eye to the future or even the past.
All too often, seemingly open-minded reviews of the past are merely a means to justify preexisting views of the present. Some readers delight in discovering in classical political economy anticipations of recent technical refinements, such as the theory of utility maximization. Others use the classics to cast their contemporaries in an unfavorable light. John Maynard Keynes, for example, contrasted the common sense of the mer-cantilists with the irrelevant elegance of Professor Pigou. Still other readers find the emphasis of the classics on dynamics, growth, or capital accumulation attractive.
In using classical political economy as a polestar, many economists represent it as if it were a uniform theory accepted by all. Of course, classical political economy was never a fixed body in space, but a heterogeneous collection of literature written over a period of about 100 years. If fixity does appear, it is only in the eye of the beholder. Even if many readers do acknowledge the diversity of the literature, they single out a select group of classical political economists as its stars. In general, they portray classical political economy as orbiting around a point somewhere between Smith and Ricardo. Some hold it to be closer to one or the other, but whatever its center, there is a general consensus as to what constitutes the canonical literature.
In reality, we lack objective standards for selecting the stars of classical political economy. Writing about the entertainment industry, Moshe Adler (1985, 208) has described a process whereby stars can emerge, even when they do not significantly differ in talent from lesser lights:
The phenomenon of stars exists where consumption requires knowledge. . . . As an example, consider listening to music. Appreciation increases with knowledge. But how does one know about music? By listening to it, and by discussing it with other persons who know about it. [ We are] better off patronizing the same artist as others do. . . . Stardom is a market device to economize on learning.
Economists studying the selection of technologies have found a similar phenomenon. In the early stages of the development of a technology, seemingly trivial accidents can determine which of several technological paths is chosen. Once industry becomes locked into a particular technological standard, it may continue to follow that line of development even though hindsight shows that the neglected paths might have been superior (see Arthur 1989).
A similar process is at work in the study of classical political economy, notwithstanding the significant variations that exist in the talents of early political economists. Once the status of a book is initially elevated, students are drawn into giving it a deeper consideration. A tradition gradually builds up around what becomes treated as almost sacred texts.
Readers of these canonical works are brought into a multidimensional dialogue that includes the authors under study, their times, and the collective experience of earlier generations of readers of these texts. In this sense, ''the real life of an author emanates from his readers, disciples, commentators, opponents, critics. An author has no other existence'' (Prezzolini 1967, 190 ; see also Latour 1987, 40) .
By working and reworking these texts, each successive generation finds new levels of meaning, some of which probably eluded even the political economists who created them. As a result, these works acquire a cumulative force-albeit highly symbolic-that calls new generations to confront them once again. This process reinforces the stature of the ''founders'' of political economy, thereby confirming their status as ''stars.'' Moreover, the erection of this solid structure of scholarship facilitates analysis by providing a cognitive map of the territory, allowing future researchers to navigate with more confidence.
Smith's Wealth of Nations, as we shall see, was not a particularly influential book until a generation after its publication. Once opinion leaders found the book useful in promoting their desired political outcomes, its popularity soared. Only then did Smith become a polestar of classical political economy, and his work a reference point by which all others are judged. Because of this flawed selection process, most histories of the period studiously analyze Smith and Ricardo, along with a handful of supposedly secondary figures. Other equally deserving economists generally escape notice altogether.
This book proposes a new reading-a new cosmology so to speak-that remaps classical political economy. Here, the center is nearer to Sir James Steuart and Edward Gibbon Wakefield than to Smith and Ricardo. From this perspective, Adam Smith appears less like the sun than a moon, a lesser body whose light is largely reflected from other sources. This alternative cosmology is not an arbitrary rearrangement of the stars. It highlights important lessons from classical political economy. Within this context, Adam Smith becomes less original. His importance appears to emanate from the vigor of his ideological project of advocating laissez-faire and obfuscating all information that might cast doubt on his ideology. Others, such as Edward Gibbon Wakefield and John Rae, took a more realistic view about the nature of accumulation, but later economists set their analyses aside to create the impression of a humanitarian heritage of political economy.
Judging from the literature of the history of economic thought, it is clear this view of history has succeeded mightily. The Invention of Capitalism represents a plea to correct this legacy of error and omission. From this perspective we can see that, for all its heterogeneity, classical political economy did manage to compress much of the varied experience of its day into a compact body of literature that reflects the history of relations of production. Hence, the study of classical political economy provides an effective vantage point for the study of the history of relations of production.
Chapter 6 analyzes the role of primitive accumulation in the works of such early economists as Sir William Petty, Richard Cantillon, and the Physiocrats.
Chapter 7 concentrates on the important work of Steuart, by far the most interesting and the most incisive theorist of primitive accumulation and the social division of labor prior to Marx. Besides seeing the implications of primitive accumulation more clearly than the other classical political economists, Steuart stood alone in his willingness to write openly and honestly about the subject. This characteristic explains the comparative obscurity of his reputation.
Next, chapters 8 through 10 are devoted exclusively to Smith, who attempted to develop an alternative to Steuart. According to Smithian theory, the social division of labor would evolve in a satisfactory manner without recourse to outside intervention. This chapter demonstrates that even Smith's celebrated discussion of the invisible hand was developed as a means of avoiding the challenge that primitive accumulation posed for his system. By showing that the social division of labor would evolve without recourse to outside intervention, Smith had hoped to put the question of primitive accumulation to rest. Although Smith's theory was accepted as such, practice continued in a different manner. In fact, Smith himself advocated practices that were not in accordance with his theory. This chapter also indicates that Smith was far more interested in changing human behavior than he was with matters of economic development.
Chapter 9 examines how Smith attempted to distort history, sociology, and psychology to provide confirmation of this theory of the naturally evolving social division of labor.
Chapter 10 continues with the work of Adam Smith, who based much of his theory on the experience of the colonies. Although Smith made great use of the colonial experience, the colonials did not take him nearly as seriously as the English did. The reason is not hard to fathom. In harnessing the story of the colonies to his ideological cart, Smith did not do justice to the actual situation in the colonies. By tracing his analysis of the colonies, this chapter delves deeper into the manner in which Smith purposely obscured the nature of the social division of labor.
Chapter 11 continues the study of Smithian theory and practice by comparing Smith with his friend Benjamin Franklin. This genial American was a man of practice rather than theory, yet his practical analysis greatly influenced the theory of his day. Franklin's role is especially key to Smith's theory of colonial development.
Chapter 12 continues the analysis of the relationship of classical political economy and primitive accumulation into the age of David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus. By reading their works and those of their contemporaries in terms of their relationship to political economy, we provide a new twist to the different interpretation of classical political economy. This chapter reveals that despite the adherence to the doctrine of laissezfaire in theory, classical political economists maintained a strong interest in promoting policies that furthered primitive accumulation.
Chapter 13 investigates the reaction against Smith, beginning with the relatively unknown work of Robert Gourlay and the development of his ideas in the practical school of Wakefield, the systemic colonizer who stressed that the social division of labor should be organized for the purpose of capitalist development. The chapter concludes with an analysis of John Rae.
Chapter 14 discusses the commonality between Smith and such later revolutionary leaders as Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung.
Dark Designs
Classical political economy is the product of a stormy period, distinguished by the emergence of capitalist social relations. These truly momentous changes of the time do not seem to appear in the great theoretical works of the time. Indeed, the classical political economists displayed little interest in conveying information about the great conflicts between capital and labor, or between capital and early precapitalist relations in the countryside. Nonetheless, these matters were of great importance to classical political economy.
While we catch an occasional glimpse of primitive accumulation in the canonical works of classical political economy, for the most part, we must read of the glaring conflicts indirectly. Our tactic is to approach classical political economy in the way that children learn to view a solar eclipse: by punching a small hole in a piece of paper held above another piece. The dark design that appears on the lower paper is the shadow of an eclipse, albeit with some refraction. The classical political economists made this indirect approach necessary because they were generally successful in obscuring the role of primitive accumulation in their theoretical texts. Yet, as mentioned earlier, when we turn to their letters, diaries, and more policy-oriented works, the importance of primitive accumulation becomes far clearer.
We can push our analogy of classical political economy and solar eclipses a bit further. Both represent rare and fascinating events. Past peoples have superstitiously interpreted solar eclipses as signs of impending epochal change. Similarly, the titans of political economy were thought to have been able to see over the heads of their contemporaries into the future. In this sense, their theories foreshadowed coming changes in the structure of society.
Both phenomena, planetary configurations found millions of miles away and the social changes of a century or more ago, reflect important forces that still shape our lives. Specifically, the struggle against selfprovisioning is not confined to the distant past. It continues to this day (see Perelman 1991b). In effect, we can look at the eclipse of precapitalist production relations in much the same fashion, with one major exception: in the case of a solar eclipse, the brilliance of the source can destroy our vision. In the case of classical political economy, the source has attempted to obscure our vision.
Revising Classical Political Economy
Our classical forbearers may have been bright, but they were also fallible human beings. They were certainly not wholly disinterested observers. Their theories were intended to advance their own interests or those of the groups with whom they identified. These interests colored their works, whether or not they realized this influence themselves.
In regard to the struggle over primitive accumulation, these writers seem to have been intentionally obscure insofar as they could, lest they undermine their claim to generality for their theory. The struggle against the self-provisioning of rural people cast only a light shadow across the pages of classical political economy, a glimpse of an all-but-forgotten way of life obliterated by the process of primitive accumulation. Consequently, this process has largely gone unnoticed by modern readers of classical political economy.
Although we find ourselves reduced to studying the shadows of this struggle, the attempt is still worth the effort. Indeed, we will see that classical political economy conforms to a consistent pattern of almost always supporting positions that would work to harness small-scale agricultural producers to the interests of capital.
This book may be controversial in that it contradicts the commonly accepted theory that classical political economy offered its unconditional support for the doctrine of laissez-faire. It questions the relative importance of the almost universally admired Smith and makes the case that Smith and other classical authors sought to promote the process of primitive accumulation. This rereading suggests that classical political econ-omy followed a different project, one that contradicts the standard interpretation of classical political economy.
Before turning to the main body of this work, I wish to append a caveat about my imagery of the eclipse. By studying the shadows cast by the classics, we must keep in mind that such images have fewer dimensions than the object under study. One dimension that disappears from the perspective of classical political economy concerns the social relations between labor and capital. Writing from the comfortable heights of their elevated social position, the classical political economists interpreted working-class organization as mere disorder. Because of this insensitivity, a work such as this one is necessarily imbalanced. Much attention is given to the efforts of capital to control labor, but little is devoted to the reverse. I leave the reader with the responsibility of estimating the actual balance of forces.
I hope that this book succeeds in making three points. First, primitive accumulation was an important force in capitalist development. Second, primitive accumulation cannot be relegated to a precapitalist past or even some imagined moment when feudal society suddenly became capitalist. Primitive accumulation played a continuing role in capitalist development. Third, classical political economy was concerned with promoting primitive accumulation in order to foster capitalist development, even though the logic of primitive accumulation was in direct conflict with the classical political economists' purported adherence to the values of laissez-faire.
I recognize that the seeds of capitalism had been planted long before the age of classical political economy, but never before and nowhere else had the process of capital accumulation become so intense. Hopefully, The Invention of Capitalism will throw light on the origins of that intensity.
